Equal opportunity to compete : South African competition policy promotes both fair market practices and economic empowerment for previously disadvantaged racial groups by Dale, Stephen
In both developed countries and in the newly liberalized
economies of the developing world, the essential aim of
competition law is to ensure that consumers realize the
benefits of a free and open marketplace.
By addressing issues such as mergers, abuse of dominant
market position, and collusion between competitors, these
laws are designed to prevent companies from taking
advantage of their customers by fixing prices or skimping
on quality. The underlying idea is that true competition in
the marketplace produces a range of efficiencies and asso-
ciated benefits that the competing firms, in their quest to
win customer loyalty, will feel compelled to pass along to
consumers.
In recent years, many developing countries have intro-
duced new competition laws in conjunction with other eco-
nomic reforms such as trade and investment liberalization
and privatization programs. While some governments have
simply copied laws from Europe, the United States, and
Canada, others believe that these laws must reflect unique
national circumstances and historical realities.
This is nowhere more evident than in South Africa, where
the former apartheid regime imposed rigid barriers that
severely limited the economic participation of racial groups
categorized as blacks, coloureds, and Asians. Indeed, the
country is bound by the legacy of an economy where, for
over a century, power was concentrated in the hands of a
few large white-owned firms. The current government is




















Equal Opportunity to Compete
South African competition policy promotes both fair market practices and
economic empowerment for previously disadvantaged racial groups.
Competition law in South Africa acknowledges that ensuring open, free, and
competitive markets today requires addressing the injustices of the past. The law
is exerting a subtle influence over the way in which South Africans do business.
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C a s e s t u d y
THE POWER OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Competition
and Development
South Africa’s competition law mixes considerations of purely













enterprises and an environment of dynamic competition.
So much so that its competition law mixes considerations
of purely economic efficiency with those of equitable
wealth distribution and considers the particular needs
of firms that are owned or controlled by previously
disadvantaged racial groups.
A privileged few
There are several reasons why South Africa’s economy is so
highly concentrated, explains Genesis, a South African
consulting firm that participated in IDRC-supported
research on competition policy. One reason is the central
role played by the diamond industry since the late 1800s.
Since diamond mining required the deployment of large
amounts of capital and specialized expertise, mining com-
panies and the finance houses that backed them had to be
big enough to take on the task. The risk involved with
developing individual diamond properties encouraged
further consolidation: if investors joined together to form
large consortia, they could spread the risks associated with
particular digs across a wider range of projects.
The economic Goliaths borne of the diamond industry con-
tinued to grow — leading the charge, in the first part of
the 20th century, into coal and platinum mining and then
into manufacturing. Their dominance was only matched in
the latter part of the century by the state-owned compa-
nies operating in transportation, telecommunications, iron
and steel, oil and gas, and armaments.
The other major contributor to the highly concentrated
nature of economic ownership and participation in South
Africa, Genesis researchers explain, was the series of laws
and policies known collectively as apartheid. Introduced in
the 1920s to advance the interests of South Africa’s white
(predominately Afrikaner) working class, the apartheid
system favoured whites through job quotas, generous
minimum wage provisions, superior educational opportu-
nities, and agricultural protection measures. Conversely,
apartheid laws denied the non-white majority any mean-
ingful economic role by repressing black workers’ wages,
providing other racial groups with only minimal education,
and forbidding them to unionize or to enter the
professions.
After the fall of apartheid in 1994, the incoming African
National Congress (ANC) government had both social and
economic reasons for instituting a competition policy that
could address — and potentially reverse — the highly
concentrated, exclusionary nature of the South African
economy.
New competition regime
Under the former National Party regime, a Competition
Board had been in operation since 1979. However, its lim-
ited mandate and purely advisory role within the Ministry
of Trade rendered it ineffective. Today’s competition appa-
ratus, by contrast, is independent and much more vigor-
ous. Three agencies are responsible for implementing the
Competition Act of 1999: a Competition Commission that
studies possible threats to open competition and makes
recommendations; a Tribunal that weighs the arguments
and produces rulings; and an Appeal Court that reviews
and can overturn the Tribunal’s edicts.
Vani Chetty, a lawyer who has represented many busi-
nesses before the competition authorities, believes those
authorities have had a real impact on South Africa’s eco-
nomic life. They have “grown from a fledgling institution
with very little credibility to one with much greater stature
and knowledge,” she says. “Whereas businesses in particu-
lar were reluctant in the beginning and unsure of what
they had to do to comply with the competition law, today
they are aware of what penalties are involved and they
put a lot of money, time, and effort into making sure that
they comply at all levels.”
Still, the competition agencies have faced considerable
challenges, partly because the Competition Act has two
distinct mandates: economic and social. Some of the Act’s
objectives are purely economic — its stated purposes
include, for example, “to promote the efficiency, adapt-
ability and development of the economy”; “to provide
consumers with competitive prices and product choices”;
The Competition Act “[promotes] a greater spread of














and “to expand opportunities for South African participa-
tion in world markets.” These goals align closely with the
broader economic aims of the ANC government, which
embraced free market policies when it took power and
sought to take advantage of the new export opportunities
that came with the lifting of the international community’s
anti-apartheid economic sanctions.
The Competition Act is also designed to serve social objec-
tives such as “[promoting] a greater spread of ownership,
in particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically
disadvantaged persons.” The Act’s public interest provision
also allows the Competition Authorities to take into
account the impact of mergers on employment, in a coun-
try where unemployment rates are among the highest in
the world. This aspect of the Act can be seen as a comple-
ment to a broader network of policies and laws known col-
lectively as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), where the
term “black” is used to signify Africans, people of mixed
race, and Indians. BEE aims to promote black ownership of
businesses (through targets established in industry char-
ters), transfer skills to and aid the advancement of blacks
within companies, and encourage employment creation for
the black majority.
There are specific issues the Act instructs competition
authorities to examine in instances where cases have a
potential to either impede or advance the broader aims of
BEE. As University of Cape Town researcher Neo Chabane
notes in a paper published by IDRC partner Trade and
Industrial Policy Strategies, the Act allows anticompetitive
practices where they promote the ability of black-owned
and -controlled enterprises to become competitive.
“Decisions on mergers on public interest grounds,” she
adds, “… take into account the effect that the merger will
have on the ability of black small businesses or firms to
become competitive.” In some cases, mergers that might
normally be rejected on the grounds they would reduce
marketplace competition may be exempted if they support
the goals of BEE. Meanwhile, competition authorities are
mandated to reject mergers that would lead to substantial
job losses.
Commission and Tribunal at odds
Recent cases provide no definitive indication that competi-
tion authorities have settled on a formula for balancing
the Act’s distinct — and sometimes competing — social and
economic goals. Differing views persist on how to serve the
Act’s objectives in practice.
In one case, for example, a small producer of treated
wooden poles, Nationwide Poles, had discovered that it
was paying a higher price for its “creosote” wood preser-
vative than its competitors, since the large firm Sasol Oil
was offering discounts for higher volume purchases.
Nationwide complained that this constituted discrimination
against smaller firms — an issue of some concern both
because of the government’s desire to see a larger portion
of the economy devolved into the hands of smaller compa-
nies, and because small- and medium-sized firms are seen
as a promising avenue through which the previously
excluded black population can take on a more meaningful
economic role. The Competition Tribunal ruled in favour of
Nationwide, partly based on its determination that Sasol
was acting out of market dominance and that the 3 to
4 percent price differential was significant enough to con-
stitute a barrier to small firms operating effectively in this
market. However, the Appeal Court overturned the
Tribunal’s decision, arguing that there was no evidence to
show that Sasol’s pricing structure had undermined
Nationwide’s ability to compete.
In another case, the Competition Commission had recom-
mended that a takeover of a branch of Barloworld
Equipment Finance by Wesbank have conditions attached
to it. Concerned that many of Barloworld’s customers —
small- and medium-sized industries owned by previously
disadvantaged people — might lose access to credit after
the merger, the Commission wanted to ensure the com-
pany would be committed to continuing to serve those
customers. The Tribunal, however, believed that a number
of marketplace conditions already protected the customers
and approved the merger without conditions.
Competition authorities in South Africa are mandated to reject














The ongoing disagreement between the competition agen-
cies over when and how they should act to uphold the
“public interest” components of the Competition Act
underscores a broader debate in South Africa. Some econo-
mists, for example, have been puzzling over whether com-
petition policy is really the right vehicle for promoting
social goals. Lawyer Vani Chetty ventures, meanwhile, that
while public interest hasn’t trumped purely economic argu-
ments in cases like those mentioned earlier, competition
law has helped advance awareness of equity issues and
promoted positive change in less visible ways.
“I would say it’s had a more quiet impact,” she says,
“because the requirements of the Act get structured into
transactions. The Commission may never hear about it, but
when I am advising a client on how to do a merger, I make
sure that the employment provisions are understood, so
that this does not become an issue that would make the
transaction problematic. Business is concerned with getting
the deal done as quickly as possible, so it wants to take
care of those concerns.”
But the competition regime is still in its infancy and the
number of cases with BEE considerations before competi-
tion authorities is starting to grow, observes researcher
Neo Chabane. “As more and more companies change their
ownership structure in order to reflect suggested racial
ownership ratios, the competition authorities will have to
deal with an increasing number of mergers which have
been agreed on in order to enable companies to comply
with the relevant charter in their industry.”
Taimoon Stewart, IDRC partner and international trade
specialist affiliated with the University of the West Indies,
has been following the South African experience. The
domination of developing-country economies by powerful
local elites, including some Caribbean countries, she says,
was cemented into place by deliberate policies of racial
exclusion. Stewart believes that the impact of competition
policy on social equity in South Africa is probably less dra-
matic than many may have expected, but that the process
of debate and disagreement may ultimately prove to be
positive.
“It appears that they are moving toward a rigorous appli-
cation of the law and the development of a solid jurispru-
dence,” she says, “rather than a willy-nilly application that
would in the end weaken the law and be exposed to
challenge.”
This case study was written by Stephen Dale, an Ottawa-
based writer. It is partially based on the study, Promoting
Competitive Markets in South Africa, by Stephan
Malherbe, Andrew Myburgh, Jacob Kosoff, and Paul
Anderson, of Genesis Consulting and An Evaluation of the
Influence of BEE on the Application of Competition Policy
in South Africa by Neo Chabane.
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